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SHOULD IT BE ILLICIT TO SOLICIT?
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF POLICY
OPTIONS TO REGULATE
SOLICITATION OF ORGANS FOR
TRANSPLANT
Alexandra K Glazier, JD, MPHt
Scott Sasjack, MPH
INTRODUCTION
The idea of a patient in need of a transplant using the media to se-
cure an organ is not novel-potential recipients and their advocates
have been appealing directly to the public for specific organ donations
as far back as the early 1980s. 1 However, recently there have been
several well-publicized cases in which a potential recipient has solic-
ited an organ for transplantation through the use of commercial adver-
tising. In August 2004, Todd Krampitz received a liver donation after
advertising through billboards, e-mails, the Internet, and by launching
an extensive media campaign.2 A donor family had responded to these
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Law at Boston University School of Law, and member of the UNOS Ethics Commit-
tee. The views expressed in this Article are solely the author's and are not necessarily
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University or UNOS.
J.D. candidate at Boston University School of Law. M.P.H. awarded by
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1 Lainie Friedman Ross, Media Appeals for Directed Altruistic Living Liver
Donations: Lessons from Camilo Sandoval Ewen, 45 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 329,
330-31 (2002) (stating that in 1982, Charles Fiske, a health care executive, pleaded to
a ballroom full of doctors to help him find a liver for his infant daughter, and in 1983,
President Reagan made a public appeal on his weekly radio address on behalf of
Ashley Bailey, an infant). However, these early cases do not raise the same ethical
concerns that exist today as discussed below, in part because transplants were rare and
in part because Congress did not create the national organ allocation system until
1984. In fact, some would say that the national system was created as a result of
Charles Fiske's public appeals. See infra text accompanying notes 136-39.
2 Christopher Snowbeck, Publicity Campaigns Seeking Organ Donations
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efforts by requesting that their deceased relative's liver go to
Krampitz.3 On October 20, 2004, the first known organ donation in
the U.S. to be arranged through a commercial website took place
when Robert Smitty donated a kidney to Robert Hickey, whom Smitty
had found through MatchingDonors.com. 4 Hickey had paid the web-
site a monthly fee of $295 to advertise for a donor.5 In July of 2005, a
highly publicized media campaign was launched on behalf of Shari
Kurzrok, a gravely ill New York public relations executive in need of
a liver transplant.6 Although Kurzrok ultimately received a liver
transplant through the established national system, this case, together
with the Krampitz and Hickey cases, heightened public attention
about organ solicitation and raised significant concerns about fairness,
utility, and the adequacy of the current donation and transplant sys-
tem.
All three of these recent cases involved solicitation of organs for
transplant into a specific patient. This is referred to as "directed dona-
tion," meaning that the donor (or his or her family) directs donation of
a specific organ to a specific recipient. The Smitty case is an example
of a directed donation in the living donor context. Smitty agreed to
donate one of his kidneys to a specified recipient. The Krampitz and
Kurzrok cases are examples of solicitation for directed donation in the
deceased context. The liver donation being solicited in both cases
would come from a deceased donor.
In both the living and deceased donor contexts, directed donations
to strangers are uncommon. In fact, the overwhelming majority of
deceased donations are not directed donations. Instead, donated de-
ceased organs are allocated to anonymous recipients through the
United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) system.7 In those rare
Raise Ethics Questions, HEADLINES & DEADLINES, Aug. 27, 2004, http://www
.headlinesanddeadlines.org/2004/Aug_27_04/organdonors.html.
3 Id.
4 Arthur Caplan, Organs.com: New Commercially Brokered Organ Trans-
fers Raise Questions, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 8, 8.
5 Id. But see MatchingDonors.com, Membership Plan (Organ Registration
Fees), http://www.matchingdonors.com/life/index.cfin?page=services (last visited
Jan. 28, 2007) (requesting that those who cannot afford membership call to discuss
options). About seventy percent of the patients with active profiles are being listed
without charge. Robert Steinbrook, Public Solicitation of Organ Donors, 353 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 441, 442 (2005).
6 Maggie Haberman & Jordan Lite, Donor Group Blasts Blitz to Land Liver
for Shari, DAILY NEWS, July 27, 2005, at 7; Deborah L. Shelton, Debate over Appeals
for Organs Heats Up, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 21, 2005, at A10.
7 ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, OPTN/UNOS
FACILITATION OF LIVING UNRELATED KIDNEY DONATION-EXHIBITS DOCUMENT app. B
(2004) [hereinafter OPTN, UNRELATED KIDNEY DONATION], available at http://www
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cases when a deceased donor's family directs a donation, it is usually
to another family member or an individual with which the donor or
family has a personal bond.8 In comparison, directed donations are the
norm among living donors. Two-thirds of living donations are di-
rected to biological relatives, and many of the rest donate to a spouse.9
Still, only a handful of living donations have been publicly reported in
which the donor and recipient met solely for the purpose of donation
and had no preexisting relationship before the recipient's need for a
transplant was first identified.' 0
Over the past couple of years, however, public donor solicitations
resulting in directed donations to strangers are increasing.
MatchingDonors.com alone has facilitated more than a dozen trans-
plant surgeries between living donors and recipients who were strang-
ers before the donation. Dozens more are reportedly in the pre-surgery
stage, and Matchingdonors.com has over 3,700 potential donors regis-
tered on its website to whom potential recipients can appeal. 11 The
intensity of donor solicitations may be increasing as well, as evi-
denced by the Kurzrok campaign, which allegedly resorted to posting
flyers in hospitals asking families to direct a liver donation to
Kurzrok, tracking trauma patients in emergency rooms, and urging
police and emergency medical workers to identify accident victims
who might serve as donors. 12 Another interesting development is the
increasingly complex forms that organ solicitations are taking. One
website (with over 8,300 members) offers a reciprocal sharing agree-
ment whereby members pledge to direct donation of their organs in
the event of their death first to other members if a suitable match can
be found before donating to the UNOS waiting list.'
3
Federal law does not prohibit directed donation to an individual
and most states expressly permit it by statute under the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act, which governs organ donation.14 Federal regulations
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
.optn.org/PublicComment/pubcommentPropExhibit_21 .pdf.
8 Id.
9 Id. at app. A.l0 Id. (noting that OPTN does not collect data on how often this occurs).
1 Rob Stein, Search for Transplant Organs Becomes a Web Free-for-All,
WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2005, at Al; MatchingDonors.com, supra note 5 (declaring
3,709 potential donors as of Jan. 28, 2007).
12 Shelton, supra note 6; see generally Stein, supra note 11 (discussing so-
licitation of organs on the Internet).
13 LifeSharers, http://lifesharers.org (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
14 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74 (2005); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6(a)(3)
(amended 1987) or § 1 (a)(2) (amended 2006). But see VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §
5242(a), (d) (2000) (allowing only living donors to make a directed donation).
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expressly permit directed donations. 15 Despite the current legality of
directing a donation to a solicitor, many commentators consider this
practice unethical, particularly in the deceased context. This is be-
cause directed donation allows a potential recipient to effectively
"'jump[] the line' by soliciting the donation of an organ that other-
wise might have been allocated to a recipient ranked higher on the
UNOS national waiting list.' 6 The UNOS organ allocation policies are
designed to balance equity for potential recipients with medical utility.
Preferences are given according to certain equitable factors, such as
time spent on the waiting list and medical urgency.1 7 At the same
time, the allocation process is designed to accomplish utility by using
clinical factors to distribute organs to recipients who are expected to
realize the greatest clinical benefit in terms of expected survival (or
collectively "net benefit"). 18 Because these allocation policies are to
be applied uniformly, potential recipients compete equally for organs,
receiving preferences only according to these factors.
Solicitations for deceased donor directed donations bypass this
system and may, therefore, unfairly give preference to "'attractive'
patients with greater means of purchasing advertising or drawing
media attention.19 There is, however, a recognized competing auton-
omy interest in allowing a donor or donor family to choose who will
receive their anatomical gift by directing the donation.2° Some have
argued that donor solicitations are consistent with utility principles
because they may increase total donations (especially in the context of
15 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(h) (2000).
16 Douglas W. Hanto, Ethical Challenges Posed by the Solicitation of De-
ceased and Living Organ Donors, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1062-66, (2007) (arguing
that solicitation of organs potentially may circumvent the principles of justice and
utility that are the building blocks of the national allocation system); Geoff Drushel,
Directed Organ Donation Is Legal, but Is It Right?, HEPATITIS, Jan.-Mar. 2005, at 18,
18-20 (quoting Dr. Arthur L. Caplan, "a leading ethicist and chairman of the depart-
ment of medical ethics at the University of Pennsylvania"), available at http://
www.hepatitismag.com/storydetail.asp?storyid=l 33.
7 ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, POLICIES §§
3.2.1.7-3.2.1.7.9, 3.5.5, http://www.optn.org/policiesAndBylaws/policies.asp (follow
"3.2: Organ Distribution: UNOS Patient Waiting List" hyperlink for 3.2.1.7-3.2.1.9;
and follow "3.5: Organ Distribution: Allocation of Deceased Kidneys" hyperlink for
3.5.5) (last visited Jan. 23, 2007). In evaluating the allocation of kidneys, OPTN
considers whether the potential recipient has been a living organ donor in the past. Id.
at § 3.5.5.2.
IS See, e.g., id. at 3.5.3.3.1 (listing the criteria for matching kidney donors to
kidney recipients).
19 Caplan, supra note 4, at 8.
20 Mark D. Fox, When an Organ Donor Names the Recipient, AM. J.
NURSING, July 1996, at 68, 68.
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living donor solicitation), thereby benefiting all potential recipients by
moving successful solicitors off of the national waiting list.21
This Article analyzes the legality of four possible policy options
to resolve the ethical dilemma raised by solicitation of organs for
transplant. Part I considers whether public organ donor solicitations
should be restricted at all and concludes that the answer is yes for
solicitations of deceased organ donations. Part II examines why the
First Amendment right to free speech prevents policymakers from
banning outright organ solicitations. Finally, Part III provides a legal
analysis of the following policy options to address solicitation of di-
rected deceased organ donations: (1) the government prohibiting de-
ceased organ donor solicitations as speech that incites illegal activity;
(2) transplant centers refusing to transplant directed donations of de-
ceased organs that resulted from solicitation; (3) Organ Procurement
Organizations refusing to coordinate directed deceased donations
made in the absence of a preexisting relationship; and (4) statutory
ban of deceased directed donations made in the absence of a preexist-
ing relationship. Expedient resolution of this issue is ripe given the
increased public, government, and media attention on scarcity of or-
gan donation for transplant and the fact that over 6,000 patients from
the UNOS waiting list died in 2006 while awaiting an organ for trans-
plant and there are currently over 96,000 potential recipients listed on
this list.2
2
21 See Christopher Robertson, Organ Advertising: Desperate Patients Solicit
Volunteers, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics 170, 172 (2005).
22 ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, VIEW DATA
REPORTS: NATIONAL DATA, http://www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp (select "Waiting
List" for "Choose Category" under "Step 1"; then select "Candidates" for "Count"
under "Step 1"; then follow "Overall by Organ" under "Step 2") (last visited Apr. 8,
2007) (noting that 96,027 candidates are on a waiting list for an organ); ORGAN
PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, VIEW DATA REPORTS: NATIONAL
DATA, http://www.optn.org/latestData/step2.asp (select "Waiting List Removals" for
"Choose Category" under "Step 1"; then select "All" for "Choose Organ" under "Step
1"; then select "Candidates" for "Count" under "Step 1"; then follow "Removals by
Reason by Year" under "Step 2") (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) (noting that 6,038 candi-
dates died while on the organ donor waiting list in 2006).
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I. SHOULD PUBLIC ORGAN DONOR SOLICITATIONS
BE RESTRICTED AT ALL?
A. Solicitation of Deceased Organ Donations Should Be Restricted to
Maintain Equity and Medical Utility in the Organ Allocation System
Directed donation creates a conflict between distributive justice
and donor autonomy.23 The UNOS allocation policies serve principles
of distributive justice by balancing equitable factors such as time
spent on the waiting list and medical urgency with medical utility
factors that measure which potential recipients will realize the greatest
clinical benefit from a particular organ.24 This system "levels the
playing field" and allows potential recipients of deceased organ dona-
tions to compete equally under the same set of preferences. Solicita-
tions bypass this carefully crafted system because they encourage
selection of potential recipients outside of the established equity and
utility factors. However, solicitations for directed donations serve to
maximize a competing interest, donor autonomy.
The autonomy interest in directing an organ donation is often
compared to the autonomy interest in directing material wealth to a
specific individual or organization through one's will.25 Proponents of
donor solicitation believe that this interest outweighs society's interest
in medical utility. They also believe that solicitations will increase the
total number of organ donations by persuading people who otherwise
would not donate to do so. 26 By analogy, if one could not direct mone-
tary donations to the charity of one's choice, total charitable donations
would arguably decline.27 If a solicitation causes an organ donation
that otherwise would not have happened, patients listed below the
solicitor recipient on the national waiting list would presumably bene-
fit from the solicitor receiving a transplant because that individual
would then move off the list and, therefore, the other listed patients
will "move up." Patients listed above the solicitor recipient would
presumably be unaffected. Each deceased donation caused by solicita-
tion may also have a collateral effect on medical utility because a de-
23 Fox, supra note 20, at 68.
24 See supra notes 18-19.
25 Dan Brock, Dir., Div. of Med. Ethics, Harvard Med. Sch., Speech at the
Harvard Medical School of Medical Ethics Forum: Soliciting Organs on the Internet
(May 12, 2005); see also Klaus D. Teichmann, Letters to the Editor: Directed Tissue
Donations, 33 CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL OPHTHALMOLOGY 112, 112 (2005).
26 See Robertson, supra note 21, at 172.
27 See Aaron Spital, Must Kidney Donation by Living Strangers be Non-
directed?, 72 TRANSPLANTATION 966, 966 (2001).
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ceased donor usually donates multiple organs, resulting in multiple
recipients receiving transplants.2 8
It is doubtful, however, that the autonomy interest in donating to a
solicitor is what motivated state legislators to pass the Uniform Ana-
tomical Gift Act (UAGA). The framers of the UAGA did not contem-
plate directed donations arranged through solicitations and made in
the absence of any preexisting relationship between the donor and the
designated recipient. 9 Instead, the directed donation provision in the
UAGA was designed to permit families to donate needed organs to
another family member awaiting transplant. 30 The autonomy interest
at stake in directing a donation to a stranger is clearly distinguishable
from and not nearly as great as the interest that one has in directing a
donation to a family member or friend where a close relationship ex-
ists.
Furthermore, a donated organ may be distinguishable from a pri-
vate gift, e.g., wealth devised through a will, because transplantation
requires greater cooperation from people and resources beyond the
donor and intended recipient in order to effectuate the gift.3 ' In this
way, organ donations may be characterized as social gifts, and, there-
fore, society may be justified in limiting a donor's autonomy in order
to promote equity among potential recipients and ensure that the full
utility of the gift is realized.32
The likely outcome of continuing to allow public solicitations of
deceased organs is that deceased organs that might otherwise be made
available would be withheld from those patients ranked higher than
the solicitor on the UNOS waiting list.33 It is unknown whether organ
28 The national average in 2006 was 3.049 organs transplanted per deceased
organ donor. See OPTN, Donors Recovered in the U.S. by Donor Type,
http://www.optn.org/latestData/viewDataReports.asp (select "National Data" then
"Donor" for "Choose Category" under "Step I"; select "All Donors by Type" under
"Step 2"; then select "All Transplanted" under "Change Report" option) (last visited
Apr. 8, 2007) (stating that there were 8,022 deceased donors and resulting in 24,461
organs transplanted in 2006).
29 E-mail from Blair L. Sadler, President and CEO, Children's Hosp. and
Health Ctr., to author (Dec. 13, 2005, 14:40:00 EST) (on file with author); Drushel,
supra note 16, at 19-20 (citing Dr. R. Patrick Wood, "a transplant surgeon at St.
Luke's Episcopal Hospital"); Sheldon Zink et al., Examining the Potential Exploita-
tion of UNOS Policies, AM. J. BIOETHICS, July-Aug. 2005, at 6, 8.
30 Zink et al., supra note 29, at 8.
31 See Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Designated Organ Donation: Private Choice
in Social Context, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 10, 11.
32 See id. at 11-13. But see Brock, supra note 25 (noting that organ donation
should be regulated to prevent abuse, but allowing directed donation might increase
the total number of organs donated).
33 Drushel, supra note 16, at 18-19 (citing Dr. Arthur L. Caplan).
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solicitations increase total donations, but we do know that donors of
deceased organs who direct donations to solicitors are likely to have
donated anyway.34 Thus, solicitors may move ahead of those who
have waited longer, would benefit more, or have more critical need.35
Case in point, Todd Krampitz did not meet the UNOS listing criteria
because he had metastatic cancer and died just eight months after re-
ceiving transplantation of the liver he solicited.36
Also, not all policies that might increase total donations are neces-
sarily desirable, as is shown by the fact that most nations ban the pur-
chase and sale of organs.37 Organ solicitations could undermine public
support for the entire procurement and allocation system because this
practice inequitably favors those patients with "attractiveness" and the
means to purchase advertising or draw media attention.38 An appeal
for a six-month-old infant in need of a liver donation tugs on potential
donors' heartstrings, while the same appeal from a middle-aged
alcoholic may not.39 Organ solicitations convey a message that the
solicitor is ethically special compared to other potential recipients.
Solicitations request that donors donate specifically to the solicitor
instead of generally to potential recipients as a class. This invites
donors to choose recipients that appear more deserving rather than
those in greater need or who may benefit the most medically.n
For these reasons, public solicitations for directed donation of de-
ceased organs are likely to reduce both the equity and efficiency (as
measured by medical utility and net benefit) of the organ allocation
system. Lawmakers, UNOS, and health care providers should, there-
34 See Alvin Powell, HMS Examines Ethics of Internet Organ Donation,
HARV. U. GAZETrE, May 19, 2005, at 9, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/
gazette/2005/05.19/09-organ.html.
35 Drushel, supra note 16, at 18-19 (citing Dr. Arthur L. Caplan).
36 Zink et al., supra note 29, at 6; Sheldon Zink & Stacey L. Wertlieb, Re-
sponse to Commentators on "Examining the Potential Exploitation of UNOS Poli-
cies," Am. J. Bioethics, Sept.-Oct. 2005, at W15, available at http://www.bioethics
.net/joumal/j-articles.php?aid=842.
37 See generally Michele Goodwin, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND
DEMAND OF BODY PARTS (2006) (arguing a market approach would increase the sup-
ply of transplantable deceased organs); see also Andrew H. Barnett et al., Improving
Organ Donation: Compensation Versus Markets, 2 Inquiry 372 (1993), reprinted in
THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT DEBATE 209-12 (Arthur L.
Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998) (arguing that donor compensation would
increase total donations); Ross, supra note 1, at 333.
38 Caplan, supra note 4, at 8.
39 However, a middle-aged alcoholic may have the same appeal if the indi-
vidual happens to be a national hero. Ross, supra note 1, at 333 (citing R. Newhan, &
D.P. Shuit, Gravely Ill Mantle Gets New Liver, L.A. TIMES, June 9, 1995, at Al).
40 See Kluge, supra note 31, at 11-12.
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fore, consider what options are available to restrict or regulate
directed deceased donor solicitations.
B. Solicitation of Living Donations Should Be Permitted Because
They Increase Total Donations Without Sacrificing Equity and
Medical Utility
There is currently no national system for allocating organs from
living donors and no organized waiting list for potential recipients as
exists for deceased organs. 41 The overall effect of a solicited donation
from a living donor is, therefore, significantly different. A living do-
nation to a solicitor is far less likely to deprive any potential recipient
of an organ that he or she would otherwise have received.42 Instead, a
directed living donation takes the solicitor off the waiting list for de-
ceased organs or eliminates the solicitor's need to go on the list to
begin with, thereby benefiting the patients that are or would have been
listed below the solicitor. Additionally, the data supports the conclu-
sion that solicitation will likely increase living donations because
living donors prefer to donate to a person they know.43 "Please donate
your [kidney and save a life]" will never elicit the same response as
"Please donate your [kidney to Sally Smith and save her life.] 44 For
example, a media appeal in Canada on behalf of a specific recipient
resulted in fifty calls to transplant centers from people wishing to be
living donors, when transplant centers normally only receive a few
such calls a month.45
Living donors do sometimes donate without specifying a recipi-
ent. In those instances, the donated organ goes through a local
matching system to a patient on the UNOS waiting list.46 Accordingly,
41 Drushel, supra note 16, at 18-19 (citing Dr. Arthur L. Caplan). But see
OPTN/UNOS KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION COMM., REPORT FROM OPTN/UNOS
KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION COMMITTEE TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS ON KIDNEY PAIRED
DONATION (2006), available at http://www.unos.org/CommitteeReports/boardmain
_KidneyTransplantationConmmittee_6_28200613 30.pdf (recent proposal being
consideration by UNOS to increase living donation by investigating the potential for a
national system to "match" pairs of living donors and their intended but incompatible
recipients with other similar pairs in an organized organ swap).
42 id.
43 See OPTN, UNRELATED KIDNEY DONATION, supra note 7, at app. A; see
also Jacob M. Appel & Mark D. Fox, Organ Solicitation on the Internet: Every Man
for Himself?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 2005, at 14, 14-15.
44 See Appel & Fox, supra note 43, at 15.
45 Ross, supra note 1, at 332.
46 See, e.g., New England Program for Kidney Exchange, http://www.nepke
.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2007); OPTN, UNRELATED KIDNEY DONATION, supra note 7,
at app. A.
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it is possible that a solicitor may receive an organ from living donors
that would have been allocated to a different recipient on the UNOS
list. However, anonymous, non-directed donations to the waiting list
from living donors are rare. Only eighty-seven transplants of organs
from these so-called "Good Samaritan" donors were performed na-
tionwide in 2004.47
Good Samaritan donations are rare because of an important dis-
tinction between donation in the living and deceased contexts: the
living donor's significant personal sacrifice. Unlike a deceased donor
or a deceased donor's family, a living donor must bear the personal
health risks of invasive surgery and living without the donated organ.
Most solicited living donors would likely not have donated unless
they could direct their donation to the solicitor recipient. For this
reason, permitting the solicitation of living donors is more likely to
increase total organ donations, which is a clear benefit to the entire
organ donation and transplantation system. This is in contrast to so-
licitation of deceased organs, which is not likely to increase total
donations but, rather, divert donated organs to solicitors rather than to
potential recipients identified by the national allocation system.
The serious sacrifice made by living donors is also significant in
evaluating the donor's autonomy interest in directing a donation. A
living donor makes a far greater personal sacrifice than a deceased
donor (who makes no personal sacrifice because the donation occurs
after death). Also, unlike the deceased donor, a living donor may also
experience some benefit through forming a personal bond with the
recipient after transplantation or by knowing that a life has been saved
by the donation. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that society
should give the donor's autonomy interest more weight in the living
context than in the deceased context.
It remains true that "attractive patients" and those with greater
means of purchasing advertising or drawing media attention will in-
evitably be more successful at soliciting living donors. 48 Also, there is
a possible added inequity in the living context because federal law
permits payment of reasonable compensation for the living donor's
travel expenses and lost wages associated with living donation.49 A
solicitor who has the financial means to reimburse a living donor for
these costs may be more likely to successfully solicit a living donor.
47 OPTN, UNRELATED KIDNEY DONATION, supra note 7, at app. A.
48 Caplan, supra note 4, at 8.
4' 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2005). Although the deceased donor does not
incur travel costs or lost wages, the costs associated with a deceased donation are
never born by the donor family.
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In one recent case, these expenses included a stay in a luxury hotel
and totaled $5,000, a sum that not all solicitors can afford. 50
The existence of possible inequities may not, however, justify
prohibiting living donations directed to solicitors as it does in the case
of deceased donation. Increasing the total number of living organ do-
nations is more likely to benefit other potential recipients rather than
to deprive them of organs that they otherwise might have received.
With no national system in place for living donation carefully crafted
to maximize equity and efficiency that donor solicitations would dis-
rupt, it seems reasonable to conclude that the living donor's autonomy
interest in directing a donation deserves more significant weight.
Thus, the overriding consideration is that solicitations of living donors
are more likely to increase total organ donations in a manner that re-
mains fair in the balance. Lawmakers, UNOS, and health care provid-
ers should, therefore, continue to permit and encourage solicitations of
living donors and directed donations made by living donors to solici-
tors. 51
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF ORGAN DONOR
SOLICITATIONS AS CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED SPEECH
Regardless of how deceased organ donor solicitations are classi-
fied, they fit squarely under the umbrella of free speech protected by
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. An outright
government ban on deceased organ donor solicitations would, there-
fore, clearly be unconstitutional. Certain reasonable regulations on
directed donor solicitations may, however, pass constitutional muster
depending on the level of legal scrutiny that applies.
A. Protection for Charitable Solicitations: Strict Scrutiny Review
It is settled law that charitable organizations that solicit gifts or fi-
nancial contributions are protected under the First Amendment.
52
Charitable appeals are protected free speech because they involve a
variety of speech interests such as communication of information, the
dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy
of causes.53 Additionally, charitable "solicitation is characteristically
intertwined with informative.., speech [promoting] economic, politi-
50 Appel & Fox, supra note 43, at 14.
51 See OPTN/UNOS KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION COMM., supra note 41.
52 Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632
(1980).
53 id.
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cal, [and] social issues. ''54 Although the Supreme Court has not spe-
cifically considered whether an individual solicitor seeking private
charity is protected under the First Amendment, circuit courts have
found no meaningful distinction between soliciting for oneself versus
soliciting for a charitable organization because both forms of speech
contain social messages.
55
The Supreme Court applies the most exacting level of analysis,
strict scrutiny, to any regulation that restricts protected speech on the
basis of its content. 6 To meet strict scrutiny, any regulation must be
"necessary to serve a compelling state interest and [must be] narrowly
drawn to achieve that end.",
57
In contrast, commercial speech receives only intermediate protec-
tion under the First Amendment. Speech is considered commercial
when it is primarily related to the economic interests of the speaker or
is primarily concerned with providing information about the costs of
goods and services or proposing a commercial transaction. 58 For ex-
ample, a contraceptive manufacturer that mails advertisements for its
products engages in commercial speech despite the fact that the com-
munication contains information on issues such as venereal disease
and family planning.59 Here it can be inferred that the manufacturer's
primary purpose was not disseminating information on venereal dis-
ease and family planning. This is because the communication took the
form of an advertisement for a specific product and was motivated by
an economic interest (soliciting a commercial transaction).6°
Applying this test to charitable solicitation, the Supreme Court
has found that charitable solicitations are not commercial speech.6'
This is because charitable solicitations are concerned with more than
just the economic interests of the speaker, providing cost information
54 Id.
55 See Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 903-04 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding
that even panhandling is protected free speech because it may contain social messages
on the issue of poverty).
56 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
57 Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (citing
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591-92
(1983)).
58 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980). The government may only restrict
commercial speech if the speech presents deceptive information or if the restriction
directly advances a substantial government interest and is not excessive. Hudson, 447
U.S. at 564-565. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770-71 (1976).
59 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67-69 (1983).
60 Id.
61 Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
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about goods and services, or proposing a commercial transaction.
They are "intertwined with informative . . . speech [advancing] eco-
nomic, political, [and] social issues. 62
Courts distinguish between commercial and noncommercial
speech on the basis of the content of the message itself, not the mode
in which the speaker transmits it. Speech that is otherwise considered
noncommercial does not become commercial merely because its
speaker delivers the message in a paid advertisement.63 For example,
in considering whether a newspaper committed libel for running a
paid advertisement, the Supreme Court held that whether the news-
paper was paid for the advertisement was irrelevant in determining
whether it had engaged in commercial speech.64 "To hold otherwise
would convert virtually all books, newspapers, and magazines into
commercial speech [merely because the printer was paid], and call
into question the traditional protections afforded these types of publi-
cations." 65 In fact, the Supreme Court has clarified that a speaker may
even hire canvassers to promote a noncommercial message without
engaging in commercial speech.66 In this manner, the First Amend-
ment protects the right not only to advocate a cause but also to select
the most effective means for doing SO.
67
B. Intrusive Charitable Solicitations: Reasonableness Standard
More intrusive charitable solicitations (such as those requesting
money) are subject to reasonable regulation.68 For example, courts
have reasoned that solicitations of funds on a public street are intru-
sive because the solicitor and others watch and may exert social pres-
sure on the person solicited, who may then have to stop on a busy
street and open his wallet.69 This type of solicitation is considered
more intrusive than solicitations that merely involve the distribution
62 Id.
63 Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514-15 (1981) (The court
treated messages conveyed on billboards as noncommercial on the basis of their con-
tent even though they were paid advertisements.).
64 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
65 U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Am. Media, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1208 (D.
Colo. 2001).
66 See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (finding that paid petition
circulators engaged in noncommercial speech because the content of the speech itself
was noncommercial).
67 Id.
68 Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632
(1980).
69 U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 735 (1990).
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of literature.7° Of course, even the most benign solicitations can be
considered intrusive and, therefore, subject to reasonable regulation in
certain circumstances; the First Amendment does not require a city to
permit a man with a communicable disease to distribute leaflets on
public streets.7 '
The reasonableness standard is considerably easier for the gov-
ernment to meet than the strict scrutiny standard. To be reasonable, a
regulation must appropriately balance legitimate government interests
against the right to free speech and cannot be overly broad.72 For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has held that the government's legitimate
interest in preventing fraudulent solicitations (such as burglars posing
as canvassers) justifies the reasonable requirement that canvassers
register with a town prior to canvassing and establish their identities
and affiliation with the organization they represent.73
C. Organ Donor Solicitations are Charitable Solicitations
Nonprofit organizations (such as MatchingDonors.com) that so-
licit donors are likely to be considered protected under the First
Amendment as charitable solicitors because their services promote the
social issue of organ donation by encouraging organ donations in the
broader context.74 An individual organ solicitor is also likely to be
protected under the First Amendment because the solicitation pro-
motes the social issue of organ donation. For example, the appeals on
behalf of Todd Krampitz always contained broader requests for peo-
ple to donate organs, and, after he received a directed donation, the
family put up a new billboard that said "'Thank You"' and encour-
aged more people to donate organs for transplant.75
Deceased organ donor solicitations are also likely to be consid-
ered noncommercial speech because they are not primarily concerned
with providing information about the costs of goods and services or
proposing a commercial transaction, nor are they primarily related to
the economic interests of the organ solicitor. They are primarily con-
70 id.
71 Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
72 See Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y v. Viii. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
165-66 (2002).
71 Id. at 162-63 (citing Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 306 (1940)).
74 MatchingDonors.com is now a nonprofit organization. Secretary of Mas-
sachusetts, Corporate Database Listing for "MATCHNGDONORS.ORG, INC.,"
http://corp.sec.state.ma.us/corp/corpsearch/CorpSearchSummary.asp?ReadFromDB =
True&UpdateAllowed=&FEIN=000891332 (last visited Jan. 4, 2007) (listing
MATCHINGDONORS.ORG, NC. as a nonprofit organization).
75 Drushel, supra note 16, at 18-19; Snowbeck, supra note 2.
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cemed with obtaining a life-saving gift from potential deceased
donors and promoting the social message that more people should
donate life-saving organs. Although made in the form of an adver-
tisement, these solicitations make no reference to a specific product or
to the costs of goods or services and, at least on their face, do not pro-
pose a commercial transaction.
A for-profit corporation that posts paid solicitations for organ do-
nors may not be considered to have engaged in commercial speech
either because the content of the solicitor's message itself is not com-
mercial. Such a corporation would be treated and protected like a
newspaper that is paid to print constitutionally protected advertise-
ments.76 Even if a corporation were actively soliciting organ donors
on behalf of its clients, it would still not be engaging in commercial
speech because the clients' noncommercial messages are not made
commercial merely because they took the form of a paid advertise-
ment or because the clients paid others to present them.7 Here, the
corporation would likely be treated and protected like canvassers paid
to promote a speaker's political message. 78 Again, the First Amend-
ment protects not only the solicitor's right to communicate his mes-
sage, but also the right to select the most effective means for doing
so.
79
D. Reasonable Regulation of Intrusive Deceased Organ Donor
Solicitations
Whether a court subjects regulations of deceased organ donor so-
licitations to the strict scrutiny standard or the reasonableness standard
of review might depend on how intrusive the particular solicitations
involved are. If a particular method of solicitation is found not to be
intrusive, any regulation of it would have to satisfy strict scrutiny by
being necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly
drawn to achieve that end. Examples of less intrusive solicitations
may include informative media reports, the general posting of an or-
76 Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) ("[The
fact] [t]hat the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in
this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold. Any other conclu-
sion would discourage newspapers from carrying 'editorial advertisements' of this
type, and so might shut off an important outlet for the promulgation of information
and ideas by persons who do not themselves have access to publishing facilities -
who wish to exercise their freedom of speech even though they are not members of
the press." (citations omitted)).
7 See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514-15 (1981).
78 Cf. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1988).
79 Id. at 425.
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gan donation request in a public place or on the Internet, or the
LifeSharers website, which invites members to agree to direct their
organs in the event of their death first to other members if a suitable
match can be found (a reciprocal sharing agreement).8° In these cases,
the solicitor does not physically approach anyone, and the person so-
licited is free to ignore the solicitation without consequence. Then
again, in the case of posting requests in a public place or on the Inter-
net, it is possible to argue that the intrusive part of the solicitation
occurs later, after the person solicited makes initial contact with the
solicitor to discuss the details.
If a particular type of solicitation is not considered intrusive, an
outright government ban is unlikely to satisfy the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review. The government might argue that banning deceased
organ donation solicitations is necessary to achieve its primary objects
of preserving equity and medical utility through the current system.
However, despite the fact that this conclusion seems well reasoned,
there is no empirical data to show that deceased organ solicitations
will harm the national organ allocation system or to refute the
counter-argument that solicitations may increase total donations.8'
Thus, it would be difficult for the government to adequately show that
an outright ban on deceased organ donation solicitations is "neces-
sary" to accomplish those goals. Other less restrictive measures may
be possible as discussed below.
In comparison, deceased directed donation solicitations character-
ized as intrusive could be subject to reasonable regulation.82 Because
80 LifeSharers, supra note 13. Membership in an organization such as
LifeSharers is also protected by the First Amendment right to freedom of association.
See Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) (explaining that the government can
only prohibit membership in a group if there is specific intent to further a group's
illegal activities). However, there is no statutory right to direct a donation to a class of
people because directed donation is statutorily defined as donation to a "designated
individual." UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6(a)(3) (amended 1987). Thus, it is un-
clear whether a court would uphold the right to direct a donation to members of the
organization ("designate as donee that LifeSharers member who is the most suitable
match") rather than to a specific named individual. Although LifeSharers states on its
website that at the time of a LifeSharers member's death they provide the next of kin
with the names of LifeSharers members, it is uncertain whether a list of members who
are awaiting organ transplants constitutes a designated individual for purposes of
directed donation laws.
81 See Powell, supra note 34.
82 In fact, there are existing federal regulations on "soliciting" consent for
donation within the established national organ donation system. These federal hospi-
tal and organ procurement organization (OPO) regulations specify that families of
potential organ donors that meet certain clinical criteria are to be approached for
consent by OPO professionals or by "designated requestors" trained by an OPO. 42
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society values donated organs for transplant as a scarce national re-
source and because of the personal and physical nature of an organ
donation, deceased organ solicitations are likely to be considered at
least as intrusive as solicitations for funds.83 Certainly deceased di-
rected donation solicitations involving contact with emergency work-
ers or hospital staff or where there is an in-person solicitation of a
potential donor or donor family are likely to be considered intrusive.8
4
Moreover, the government has several legitimate interests in regulat-
ing deceased organ solicitations. First, it has an interest in promoting
deceased organ donation and the equitable and efficient allocation of
donated organs. Second, while it has an interest in increasing dona-
tions, it also has an interest in preventing solicitors from putting
undue emotional pressure on potential donors or donor families or
misrepresenting their condition. 85 Finally, it has an interest in prevent-
ing solicitors from inappropriately offering to purchase organs from
donors, which is a federal offense.86
To be reasonable, any restriction must balance the right to free
speech with these legitimate interests. Reasonable restrictions may
include requirements that deceased organ solicitors establish their
identity, present only truthful information regarding the potential re-
cipient's condition, and use non-coercive language. Restrictions on
the time, place, and manner of deceased organ solicitation (such as a
prohibition on directed donation solicitations in a hospital) are likely
to be considered reasonable. It may even be reasonable to require de-
ceased directed donation solicitations to carry a disclaimer that UNOS
does not support deceased directed donations to solicitors and to re-
quire the URL for a website containing information on the issue. All
of these restrictions on deceased directed donation solicitation are
likely to be considered reasonable if such a standard applies. How-
CFR § 482.45(a)(3) (2005).
83 There are, however, neither health risks nor benefits to the deceased donor
because the donation occurs after the donor's death, whereas a living donor makes an
extreme sacrifice. See discussion supra Part I.B.
84 Of course, restrictions against such extreme forms of donor solicitation
would probably meet the strict scrutiny standard as well. Nevertheless, the reason-
ableness standard is likely to be applied to any restriction on solicitations in hospitals
even without a showing that the solicitation is intrusive because a hospital is not a
traditional public forum intended to promote the free exchange of ideas. See Int'l
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992). This distinction
could be important for a solicitation such as a flyer posted in a hospital, which might
not be considered intrusive, and its regulation, therefore, might otherwise be subject
to strict scrutiny rather than the reasonableness standard of review.
85 Caplan, supra note 4, at 8.
86 See infra note 104 (stating that the sale of organs is illegal as provided in
42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2005)).
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ever, an outright ban on deceased donor solicitation is unlikely to
withstand a constitutional challenge that it is an unreasonable restric-
tion because it would not adequately balance government interests
with the right to free speech. Thus, while Congress and states cannot
ban outright deceased directed donation solicitations, they may be
able to pass reasonable regulations on intrusive deceased directed
donation solicitations.
E. Organ Donor Solicitations Are Protected Even if Characterized as
Commercial Speech
Although commercial speech receives less protection than other
forms of speech, it remains protected under the First Amendment.87
The government may only restrict commercial speech if the speech
presents deceptive information or if the restriction directly advances a
substantial government interest and is not excessive. 88 To assert that a
restriction advances a substantial interest, the government must show
that there are real harms that the restriction will alleviate to a material
degree.
89
For commercial solicitations, the government can meet its burden
if it is reasonable to presume that, more often than not, the solicita-
tions are injurious to the person solicited.90 For example, the Supreme
Court has held that a state may prohibit lawyers from soliciting clients
in person because lawyers are trained in the art of persuasion and are
capable of convincing an injured and distressed layperson to place
trust in the lawyer regardless of the lawyer's qualifications or the in-
dividual's actual need for legal representation. 91 Also, the Court stated
that the lawyer's solicitation itself may cause distress to the layperson
at the time of injury.92 Thus, the Supreme Court found that it is rea-
sonable to presume that, more often than not, in person solicitations
by lawyers are "injurious to the person solicited., 93 In contrast, the
Supreme Court struck down a state ban on personal solicitations by
certified public accountants because it is not reasonable to presume
that such solicitations are injurious to the person solicited more often
87 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765-67 (1993).
88 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
564-65 (1980).
8 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71.
90 See id. at 775-76; Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466
(1978).
91 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464-65.
92 Id. at 465-66.
93 Id. at 466.
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than not.94 The Court reasoned that accountants are not trained in the
art of persuasion, and the clients they solicit are sophisticated business
executives who can choose when and where to meet them.95
In the case of commercial deceased directed donation solicitation,
it is unlikely that the government could show that a flat ban advances
a substantial interest and is not excessive. The government has legiti-
mate interests such as preventing solicitors from coercing donors and
donor families, preventing them from presenting deceptive informa-
tion, and preventing them from offering payment for organs (a federal
offense).96 It may be difficult, however, for the government to show
that the solicitations are injurious to the person solicited more often
than not. In the deceased context, the primary harm of organ solicita-
tions for directed donations is to other potential transplant recipients.
This possible harm to other potential recipients results from donors
exercising their statutory right to direct organ donations and not di-
rectly from the solicitation itself. There may also be some emotional
harm to the donor's family if the solicitation is insensitive, offensive,
or intrusive. A deceased organ solicitation made by one skilled in the
art of persuasion at a hospital or at the donor's time of death may be
injurious in the same way a lawyer's solicitation of an injured and
distressed client is. Still, an outright ban would likely be considered
excessive because, in most other contexts, these solicitations will not
be injurious to donors or donor families more often than not.97
The government has a legitimate interest in preventing the harm
to other potential recipients that would occur if deceased directed do-
nation solicitations prevent the equitable and efficient allocation of
organs. Nevertheless, the government is unlikely to meet its burden of
showing that a ban would alleviate a real harm to the national alloca-
tion system because there is no direct evidence to refute the counter-
argument that solicitations will increase total donations.98 Thus, at
least at the present time, it would be difficult for the government to
94 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 775-76.
95 id.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 81-84 (discussing these legitimate
government interests).
97 In the living context, there is an argument that living donors are always
harmed when they donate an organ. Yet this is balanced by the argument that living
donors may benefit by knowing that they have saved or improved a life. Thus, it is not
reasonable to presume that living donor solicitations will harm living donors more
often than not, and, therefore, it is also unlikely that the government could show that a
ban would alleviate a real harm to living donors. Also, a ban on living donor solicita-
tions would be considered excessive because living donors can be protected through
the informed consent process. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
98 See Powell, supra note 34.
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show that a ban would advance the substantial interest of preventing
harm to the national organ allocation system.
Therefore, even if deceased organ solicitations could be classified
as commercial speech, it is unlikely that an outright ban would with-
stand a constitutional challenge. Nevertheless, other restrictions may
be constitutional if they restrict deceptive solicitations or advance a
substantial interest and are not excessive. Potential regulations include
those discussed above in the previous section as reasonable regula-
tions of more intrusive charitable solicitations.
III. POLICY OPTIONS TO RESTRICT DECEASED
DIRECTED DONATION SOLICITATIONS
A. Prohibiting Deceased Directed Donation Solicitations as Speech
that Incites Illegal Activity
The government may ban speech that incites illegal activity if the
speech is directed toward producing imminent illegal action and is
likely to succeed.99 To show that speech is directed toward producing
illegal action, the government must show that the speaker had intent to
produce illegal action.100 A ban on speech that incites illegal activity
must only apply to speech that satisfies this intent requirement. 10
Otherwise, courts will consider the ban overly broad because it will
apply to constitutionally protected speech as well and will cause indi-
viduals to refrain from protected speech for fear of criminal sanc-
tions. 10 2 Thus, a ban on speech that incites illegal activity must be
narrowly drawn to apply only to cases where the speaker intended to
produce illegal activity.'0 3
Although directed organ donation is legal, federal law and most
state laws prohibit the purchase and sale of human organs.'0 4 Even
where state law does not prohibit selling organs, federal law is con-
99 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
1oo Id.
101 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972); Brandenburg, 395 U.S.
at 447-48.
102 Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520-2 1.
103 Id. at 520-21; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-48.
4 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2005) (providing that it is illegal to sell an organ for
valuable consideration); see, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (Consol. 2007) (it is
illegal to knowingly transfer any human organ for use in transplantation for valuable
consideration). But see UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFT ACT § 10 (amended 1987) (prohibit-
ing payment only for deceased organs); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 113, §§ 1-14
(West 2003) (lacking any prohibition on payment).
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trolling.10 5 After Robert Hickey's transplant, suspicions ran high that
he paid Robert Smitty for his kidney. This was based on the fact that
"Smitty was arrested [days after the transplant] for failure to pay...
child support, [and] anonymous benefactors posted the necessary
funds for his release. 10 6  Additionally, websites like
MatchingDonors.com admit that their clients have been barraged with
requests for cash from potential donors.1
0 7
Nevertheless, these events are not enough to justify a ban on di-
rected donation solicitations as incitement of illegal activity. Absent a
showing that a specific organ solicitor intended to pay for an organ, a
solicitation cannot be characterized as incitement of illegal activity.
An outright ban on organ solicitation would be considered overly
broad because it would apply to many cases in which a solicitor did
not intend to pay for an organ and, thus, would infringe constitution-
ally protected speech. A ban may only survive a constitutional chal-
lenge if it is narrowly drawn to apply only where a solicitor intends to
offer payment. Thus, the government cannot outright ban organ solici-
tations as incitement of illegal activity.
B. Transplant Centers Restricting Transplants for Solicitors of
Directed Deceased Donations
After Robert Hickey received his transplant, St. Luke's, the Uni-
versity of Colorado hospital that performed the transplant, issued a
moratorium on transplants for Internet-matched living donation
pairs. 10 8 Since then, hundreds of other hospitals nationwide have fol-
lowed suit. 109 If legally permissible, these policies could effectively
prevent directed donations made to solicitors in both the living and
deceased contexts. Such policies raise the potential issue of common
law liability for patient abandonment, but transplant centers can likely
take steps to protect themselves from such a claim.
Transplant centers and surgeons owe a common law duty to their
patients to continue providing care until their services are no longer
105 Roderick T. Chen, Organ Allocation and the States: Can the States Re-
strict Broader Organ Sharing?, 49 Duke L.J. 261, 281-83, 287-88 (1999) (explaining
that Congress validly enacted the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) under its
power to regulate interstate commerce because organ procurement, allocation, and
transplantation necessarily involve interstate commerce).
106 Robertson, supra note 21, at 170.
107 Stein, supra note 11.
108 Bill Scanlon, Kidney Transplant a 'Success,' ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
June 10, 2005, http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/local/article/0,1299,DR
MN 15 3847091,00.html.
- r69 Id.
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needed or are dispensed with by the patient.110 Once a physi-
cian/patient relationship is initiated, a health care provider is liable for
abandonment if it withdraws from providing care without giving rea-
sonable notice so that the patient may secure other medical care and if
an injury results."' Patient abandonment gives rise to liability for both
negligence and breach of contract claims." 12
Patient abandonment liability exists for breach of contract because
the provider has unilaterally terminated the physician/patient relation-
ship. 1 3 Patient abandonment liability for negligence exists because
the provider has breached its duty by choosing not to provide the pa-
tient with professional services at the pertinent standard of care.'
14
This differs from ordinary negligence in that the provider consciously
chooses not to provide appropriate services rather than fails to meet
the standard due to carelessness." 5 An abandonment claim fails if the
provider gives reasonable notice of withdrawing services or if the
physician/patient relationship is terminated by mutual consent. 116
Additionally, an abandonment claim should fail if the provider
has not assumed a duty of care for the patient. Thus, it may be possi-
ble to forestall an abandonment claim by limiting the scope of the
physician/patient relationship before the provider assumes a duty of
care for the patient. The physician/patient relationship is essentially a
contractual one, and providers have the right to contractually limit the
110 See, e.g., Tierney v. Univ. of Mich. Regents, 669 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2003) ("Generally speaking, a person who engages a physician to treat his
case impliedly engages him to attend throughout the illness or until his services are
dispensed with .... [However,] the physician has a definite right to withdraw from
the case provided he gives the patient reasonable notice so as to enable him to secure
other medical attendance.").
111 Id.
112 Smith v. Lemer, 387 N.W.2d 576, 579 (Iowa 1986) (citing A. HOLDER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAV 374 (1978)).
113 Id.
114 Id. (citing HOLDER, supra note 112, at 376-77 (1978)). The pertinent stan-
dard of care is met when a physician renders professional services consistent with that
objectively ascertained minimally acceptable competence he may be expected to
apply given the qualifications and level of expertise he holds himself out as possess-
ing and given the circumstances of the particular case. See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d
856, 871 (Miss. 1985).
15 Smith, 387 N.W.2d at 579 (citing HOLDER, supra note 112 at 376-77
(1978)).
116 See Dicke v. Graves, 668 P.2d 189, 191 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323(a), (b) cmt. c (1965) (commenting that, in
tort, an actor is not liable for terminating services unless his failure to provide ser-
vices increases the risk of harm or the harm is suffered because of the other's reli-
ance; noting also that this is not met if the provider gives reasonable notice for the
patient to find care elsewhere or if the patient agrees to termination).
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scope of services that they will provide patients with when they as-
sume care. 117 Although such a contract might appear to be an adhesion
contract at first blush (because the provider presents it on a "take it or
leave it basis" and the patient may lack bargaining power), courts
have distinguished between contracts limiting the scope of services to
be provided and contracts limiting the patient's right to sue for negli-
gence and have only voided the latter as adhesion contracts contrary
to public policy." 8
There are no provisions in the National Organ Transplant Act
(NOTA) or state anatomical gift statutes that abrogate a provider's
common law duty not to abandon." 9 Nevertheless, it is likely that
transplant surgeons could establish a policy of refusing to perform a
transplant for a solicitor of deceased directed donation without expos-
ing itself to abandonment liability. A provider can discharge a patient
from care and give reasonable notice for the patient to obtain care at
another transplant center if it discovers that a patient is soliciting for a
deceased directed donation.
However, if the transplant surgeon does not discover that the pa-
tient has solicited until a directed donation of an organ from a de-
ceased donor is made, it is unlikely that reasonable notice could be
given because deceased organs must be transplanted within hours.
120
Still, transplant surgeons who object to performing such transplants
may be able to protect themselves from liability even in this situation
by informing potential recipients of their policies against facilitating
transplants of deceased organs that have been directed through solici-
tation. Appropriate notice of such a policy must occur before a physi-
cian/patient relationship is established and should be acknowledged
and consented to by prospective patients. 121 This could be accom-
plished by having prospective patients agree up front that the trans-
plant surgeon is not accepting a duty to transplant deceased organs
that are directed as a result of solicitation and consent to termination
of care if the center discovers that the patient has solicited in violation
117 See Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903, 904-06 (Ga. 1981)
(finding that a teaching clinic can require patients to waive their right to insist on
complete treatment, but cannot require them to waive their right to sue for negligence
if the clinic fails to meet the standard of care required by statute).
118 See id.
"19 See Daniel G. Jardine, Liability Issues Arising out of Hospitals'and Organ
Procurement Organizations' Rejection of Valid Anatomical Gifts, 1990 Wis. L. REV.
1655, 1669-91 (1990) (arguing that there is negligence liability for rejecting donations
because doing so will foreseeably result in harm to potential recipients).
120 See ROBERT M. VEATCH, TRANSPLANTATION ETHICS 367 (2000).
121 Assuming that the transplant center feels strongly enough against donor
solicitation to refuse care and allow the directed organ to go to waste.
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of the center's policy. Such a policy would likely be considered con-
sistent with a provider's right to contractually limit the scope of care
provided. Faced with a breach of contract claim or a negligence claim,
a provider would argue that it never accepted a contract or assumed a
duty to treat the patient under these circumstances and that there was
mutual consent to termination because the patient agreed in advance
to termination of care in the event that the patient solicited directed
deceased organ donations.
There is legal precedent establishing that agreements limiting the
scope of care to be provided are not adhesion contracts.1 22 Also, such
policies are not likely to increase organ wastage because Organ Pro-
curement Organizations (OPOs) might effectively dissuade directed
donations to solicitors by informing donor families of such policies
against transplanting solicited deceased organs.1
23
C. OPOs Refusing to Facilitate Certain Directed Donations
OPOs are defined by federal regulation as nonprofit entities that
coordinate the consent, recovery, and allocation of organs from de-
ceased donors through the UNOS system.124 All parties involved in
organ transplantations from deceased donors depend on OPO person-
nel to facilitate donation. Since the federal government designates
only one OPO per geographical region with no overlap, an OPO pol-
icy of refusing to facilitate deceased directed donations made to solici-
tors would effectively prevent deceased donors and their families
within that OPO's region from making such donations.
25
122 See Emory Univ., 282 S.E.2d at 904-06. Even in the face of such a chal-
lenge, a provider could argue that such contracts support rather than undermine public
policy by preserving the integrity of the national organ allocation system.
123 Interestingly, if the OPTN or Congress decided to ban these moratoriums
on the grounds that refusing these transplants wastes organs, this would likely be a
valid exercise of authority under either Congress's power to regulate interstate com-
merce or its spending power. However, it is unlikely that the federal government
would enact such a policy given the fact that the OPTN publicly opposes directed
donation to solicitors. See infra text accompanying notes 136-42. It would appear also
that state legislatures could amend their anatomical gift statutes to ban such morator-
iums under their police power. However, such a law might be overturned for infring-
ing on a physician's due process right to not enter a physician/patient relationship, a
right that courts have generally upheld outside of the emergency care context. See
Hiser v. Randolph, 617 P.2d 774, 776 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that "a medical
[provider] is free to contract for his services as he sees fit and ... can refuse to treat a
patient, even under emergency situations"), overruled by Thompson v. Sun City
Cmty. Hosp., 688 P.2d 605, 611 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that hospitals cannot deny
emergency care without a valid cause).
124 42 C.F.R. §§ 486.302, 486.306 (2002).
125 42 C.F.R. § 486.316 (2002).
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In order to avoid any appearance that the federal government is
somehow indirectly prohibiting protected free speech (OPOs are not
government entities but do receive Medicare funding), such a policy
could be written as a refusal to accept and procure donations directed
to any recipient with whom the deceased donor has not had a preexist-
ing relationship before the recipient's need for a transplant was first
identified. 126 Such a policy may reduce any potential OPO exposure
because there is no established duty in statute or common law for an
OPO to facilitate any particular directed donation.
27
Laws that permit directed donation allow a donor or donor family
to designate an individual recipient for donation; they do not require
the donee (often the OPO) to accept the donation and facilitate its
allocation for transplant. 128 In fact, state anatomical gift statutes ex-
pressly preserve a donee's right to reject an anatomical gift.129 Thus,
these laws do not grant either the donor or the designated recipient the
right to conscript an OPO to aid him in removing a donated organ . 30
It is true that federal regulations require OPOs to conduct system-
atic efforts to acquire all usable organs from potential deceased donors
and avoid organ wastage. 131 However, federal regulations also require
OPOs to have a system for equitably allocating donated organs among
transplant patients. 132 Thus, an OPO may argue that by refusing to
facilitate deceased donations directed in the absence of a preexisting
relationship, it is fulfilling its statutory duty to equitably allocate do-
126 See discussion infra Part III.D.3.
127 But see Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 220-
26 (2d Cir. 2006) (if the OPO undertakes to coordinate a directed donation, it may
later face liability for the placement of the donated organs).
128 See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 8(a) (amended 1987).
129 Id. ("A donee may accept or reject an anatomical gift.").
130 See Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 237,
245-46, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that a designated recipient of a deceased di-
rected donation did not have an action against an OPO that allocated one of the do-
nor's kidneys to another recipient, leaving the plaintiff with only one donated kidney,
which was not transplantable). The court found that the state anatomical gift statute
was ambiguous with respect to a designated recipient's rights. It then weighed the
OPO's interests in equitably and efficiently allocating organs against the interest of a
designated recipient of a directed donation and found that the OPO's interest pre-
cluded a private right of recovery for damages for the designated recipient. On appeal,
however, the Second Circuit found that the intended recipient of a directed donation
may have a property right to the donated organ. Colavito, 438 F.3d at 222-32. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals of New York answered that the plaintiff, as a directed
donee of an incompatible kidney, had no common law right to possess the organ and,
therefore, his cause of action for conversion must fail. Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor
Network, Inc., No. 09320, slip op. (N.Y. Dec. 14, 2006).
' 42 C.F.R. § 486.306(g)(2) (2002).
132 Id. at § 486.306(i).
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nated organs. It may also argue that such a policy fulfills its duty to
acquire all usable organs more broadly by protecting the integrity of
the entire national allocation system.
Under common law, the conclusion is the same. Assuming the
OPO undertakes no steps to coordinate a particular directed donation,
an OPO owes no legal duty to designated recipients of a directed do-
nation because it never initiates or enters into a relationship with these
potential recipients and never assumes a duty of care toward them.
33
In spite of this, some have argued that an OPO assumes a duty to pro-
cure deceased organs for potential recipients by rendering services
that it should recognize as necessary for the protection of potential
recipients (a gratuitous undertaking). 134
An entity only assumes a duty of care through a gratuitous under-
taking if its failure to exercise care increases the risk of the harm or if
the harm suffered is because of the other's reliance. 35 An OPO that
refuses to facilitate a solicited directed donation does not increase the
designated recipient's risk beyond the risk that would exist if the OPO
had not rendered any services at all. Also, the harm suffered by the
designated recipient cannot be caused by reliance on the OPO if the
OPO policy is publicly stated. Moreover, even if a common law duty
could be found, it is possible to argue that federal regulations and state
anatomical gift statutes abrogate this duty by preserving a donee's
right to reject any anatomical gift and by requiring OPOs to equitably
allocate organs. 136 Under this analysis, there is no legal duty for OPOs
to facilitate solicited directed donations, and, therefore, OPOs may
choose to limit their role in coordinating directed donations made in
the absence of a preexisting relationship between the donor and the
designated recipient.
D. An OPTN Policy Limiting Facilitation of Certain Directed
Donations
In 1984, Congress authorized the Organ Procurement and Trans-
plantation Network (OPTN) to set national organ allocation policies
through NOTA. 13 7 This broad grant of authority is supported by Con-
133 See discussion supra Part III.B.
134 See Jardine, supra note 119, at 1669-91 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 323 (1965) (arguing that there is negligence liability for rejecting donations
because doing so will foreseeably result in harm to potential recipients)).
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323.
136 Note, however, that if an OPO does endeavor to coordinate a directed
donation, it may be held liable for fulfilling that undertaking. See Colavito v. N.Y.
Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 222-32 (2d Cir. 2006).
137 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2) (2005) ("The [OPTN] shall - (A) establish in one
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gress's spending power and its power to regulate interstate com-
merce.138 NOTA requires the Secretary of HHS to contract with a
private nonprofit organization to maintain the OPTN but leaves the
authority to set allocation policies with the OPTN.' 39 UNOS has held
this contract and maintained the OPTN since 1986.140
Hospitals that perform organ transplants must maintain member-
ship with the OPTN in order to receive access to organs from the
OPTN/UNOS system and receive federal Medicare funding for trans-
plant procedures. 4'1 Thus, the OPTN ultimately has authority to en-
force its policies by denying membership and access to organs from
its system to transplant centers that do not comply. The Secretary of
HHS can support OPTN policies by cutting federal Medicare funding
for transplant centers and OPOs that do not comply. 142 Because the
OPTN has broad congressional authority to set national allocation
policies and the power to set policies that transplant centers and OPOs
in all fifty states must abide by, an OPTN policy limiting solicitations
of deceased directed donation may be the most efficient solution to
the issue. So far, the OPTN Board of Directors has adopted a
statement opposing public solicitations of deceased organs and has
established a committee to examine the issue in both the living and
deceased contexts but has not taken any action with respect to its allo-
cation policies. 1
43
It may appear that the OPTN could have the authority to adopt a
policy prohibiting its members from facilitating directed donations
location or through regional centers -- (i) a national list of individuals who need or-
gans, and (ii) a national system, through the use of computers and in accordance with
established medical criteria, to match organs and individuals included in the list...
(B) establish membership criteria and medical criteria for allocating organs.").
138 42 U.S.C. § 273(a) (2005) (granting the Secretary of HHS the authority to
make grants to organ procurement organizations); see also Chen, supra note 105, at
287-88 (explaining that Congress validly enacted NOTA under its power to regulate
interstate commerce because organ procurement, allocation, and transplantation nec-
essarily involve interstate commerce).
139 Chen, supra note 105, at 280.
140 Id. at 266.
141 42 C.F.R. § 482.45(b) (2002) (membership with the OPTN is a Medicare
condition of participation for hospitals that perform organ transplants); 42 C.F.R. §
121.9(a)(1) (2002) (participation in Medicare is required in order to receive organs
from the OPTN); see supra note 136 (the OPTN has authority to set national alloca-
tion policies).
142 See discussion supra notes 138, 141.
143 OPTN, UNRELATED KIDNEY DONATION, supra note 7, at app. A; see also
Press Release, UNOS News Bureau, Organ Procurement & Transplantation Network,
OPTN/UNOS Board Opposes Solicitation for Deceased Organ Donation (Nov. 19,
2004) (noting that the OPTN has created an ad hoc committee on public solicitation),
http://www.optn.org/news/newsDetail.asp?id=374.
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and transplants that resulted from solicitation of deceased organs.
There are two potential ways to consider creating such a policy. The
first option would limit members from facilitating transplants for any
recipient that has solicited deceased organ donations, regardless of
whether or not the recipient obtained a directed donation. The second
possibility would be to only limit members from transplanting or pro-
curing deceased donor organs that were directed to the recipient as a
result of a solicitation. However, neither policy is likely to pass a con-
stitutional challenge based on infringement of protected free speech.
1. The Unconstitutional Condition Doctrine
Under the unconstitutional condition doctrine, the government
may not withhold valuable government benefits that would otherwise
be available because an individual has exercised a constitutionally
protected right, such as the right to free speech.144 The government
may not condition a benefit on the abstention from a protected right
even if the individual has no fundamental right to receive the bene-
fit. 145 For example, a state university cannot deny a non-tenured pro-
fessor continued employment because he exercised his constitutional
right to publicly criticize the university, even though the professor has
no fundamental right to employment at the university.146 The govern-
ment may not use conditional benefits to indirectly restrict a constitu-
tional right that it could not directly restrict.
147
Of course, the government can selectively choose which programs
to subsidize and does not infringe a constitutional right merely by
choosing not to subsidize the exercise of that right.148 For example, in
Rust v. Sullivan,149 the Supreme Court upheld a federal regulation that
prohibited recipients of federal funds for family planning services
from providing counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method
for family planning. 150 The Supreme Court found that the government
was not conditioning funds that would otherwise be available on the
funding recipients forgoing a constitutional right; it was merely
choosing to subsidize certain forms of counseling at the exclusion of
others. 151
144 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 597-98.
147 Id.
148 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991).
149 Id.
151 Id. at 179-80.
151 Id. at 193-94.
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However, government funding decisions based on abstentions
from protected speech are only upheld in situations where the gov-
ernment is itself the speaker or has used private speakers to transmit
information pertaining to its own program. 5 2 "'When the government
disburses public funds to private entities to convey a governmental
message, it may take... appropriate steps to ensure that its message is
... [not] distorted by the grantee. ' ' ' 153 This was the case in Rust be-
cause the Court characterized the recipients of the funding as entities
chosen by the government to transmit the government's chosen family
planning message. 
154
2. Directing OPTN Members to Prohibit Solicitation Creates an
Unconstitutional Condition
OPTN policy prohibiting its members from facilitating transplants
for any recipient that has solicited directed deceased donations creates
an unconstitutional condition because the government (acting through
the OPTN) would be conditioning valuable government benefits that
would otherwise be available to potential recipients on the condition
that potential recipients forgo their constitutional rights. Potential re-
cipients would have to abstain from exercising their First Amendment
free speech right to solicit organ donations in order to receive access
to organs from the OPTN/IUNOS system and transplantations from
Medicare funded centers. 55 If constitutional, such a policy would
essentially allow the government to indirectly do what it cannot do
directly: prohibit speech that solicits directed organ donations.
15 6
Although transplant centers with membership in the OPTN may
be characterized as private entities that the OPTN uses to transmit
information about its own programs, it is not these centers that such
an OPTN policy would force to forgo constitutional rights. Instead,
the OPTN policy would prohibit potential recipients from exercising
their constitutional rights, and these patients are neither government
speakers nor entities used by the government to transmit information.
Thus, an OPTN policy prohibiting its members from facilitating
transplants for recipients that have solicited directed deceased dona-
tions is unlikely to withstand constitutional challenge.
152 Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2001).
153 Id. at 542 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 833 (1995)).
114 Id. at 541-42; Rust, 500 U.S. at 179-80.
155 See discussion supra Part II.A-D (discussing the First Amendment right to
solicit).
156 id.
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Similarly, in the case of the more narrow policy of prohibiting
members from transplanting or procuring solicited deceased organs,
the government would be acting through the OPTN to condition valu-
able government benefits on the condition that potential recipients
forgo their constitutional right to speech. The OPTN would be deny-
ing recipients the ability to receive transplantation of directed organs
at Medicare funded centers that would otherwise be available on the
basis of whether the recipient has exercised its free speech right to
solicit.
On the other hand, recipients would not be directly penalized for
exercising their free speech right to solicit because they would still
have access to non-solicited organs from the OPTN/UNOS system
and transplantations of these organs at Medicare funded centers, re-
gardless of whether they have ever solicited for deceased directed
donations. Additionally, it is possible to argue that the speech itself is
not being directly or indirectly regulated because patients are not co-
erced to forgo their constitutional right to solicit. Instead, they are
denied a potential benefit that they may not have even if they re-
mained silent.
However, one could argue that the OPTN would still be condi-
tioning benefits that would otherwise be available on whether the
designated recipient has exercised his right of free speech. For each
directed donation, members would have to determine whether the
donation was solicited. If the named recipient did not solicit the dona-
tion, the transplantation could go forward. If the recipient did solicit,
transplantation of the directed donation could not proceed. Thus, the
OPTN would be denying the recipient a government benefit that
would otherwise be available-transplantation at a Medicare funded
hospital involving a directed organ-because that recipient had exer-
cised a constitutional right.
Furthermore, this less restrictive policy cannot be defended on the
grounds that transplant centers and OPOs are private entities used by
the OPTN to transmit information concerning its own programs. This
policy would affect the constitutional rights of potential recipients
rather than OPTN members, and potential recipients are neither gov-
ernment speakers nor entities used by the government to transmit
information. Thus, an OPTN policy prohibiting its members from
transplanting solicited directed deceased donor organs is also unlikely
to withstand constitutional challenge.
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3. The OPTN May Be Able to Limit Its Members from Facilitating
Donations Directed Toward Solicitors on the Basis of the Relationship
Between the Donor and the Designated Recipient
In contrast to an OPTN policy that focuses on the actions of the
designated recipient, an OPTN policy limiting donors from directing
deceased donations to solicitors, if carefully drafted, may withstand a
constitutional challenge. Such a policy might, for example, state that
member transplant centers and OPOs cannot facilitate deceased di-
rected donations to individuals with whom the deceased donor had no
preexisting relationship before the recipient's need for a transplant
was first identified. This may effectively prevent the allocation of
organs to individuals whom the donor or donor family came into con-
tact with solely for the purpose of facilitating an organ donation with-
out infringing on the ability to make directed donations to family
members, friends, and others with whom the donor had previous emo-
tional ties to. 157 The OPTN may be able to condition transplant center
and OPO membership on compliance with such a policy. There is
certainly a potential enforcement issue given that it may be difficult to
define or discern a "preexisting relationship." But it should be clear in
cases of pure directed donation based on solicitation that there is no
"preexisting relationship." Thus, such a policy may effectively pre-
vent directed donations that result from deceased organ solicitation.
This policy would likely not violate the unconstitutional condition
doctrine because the OPTN would not be conditioning benefits on a
recipient's exercise of the right to free speech. 58 Regardless of
whether the patient solicited, access to organs and transplantations
through the OPTN or from a directed donation made in the presence
of a preexisting relationship would remain available. The OPTN
would, therefore, not be directly or indirectly regulating protected
speech because recipients who solicit would not lose any benefits that
they otherwise would have had based on the solicitation.
Similarly, OPOs and transplant centers could make a policy dis-
tinction on the basis of whether there was a preexisting relationship
between a directed donor (or donor family) and the recipient and not
on whether the recipient exercised the constitutional right to free
speech. Such a policy would not limit a recipient's right to engage in
solicitation as protected free speech. Instead, it would limit a donor's
157 One recent proposal would allow directed donations made within blood
relationships and marriage but would require OPTN approval on a case by case basis
for all other directed donations. Zink et al., supra note 29, at 9.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 144-54 (discussing the unconstitu-
tional condition doctrine).
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ability to direct a donation. A donor's right to direct a donation to a
stranger can hardly be considered a valuable government benefit in
the same way that access to organs and transplants from the OPTN
system centers can be. For these reasons, such a policy would likely
pass an unconstitutional condition challenge.
4. An OPTN Policy Limiting Its Members from Facilitating Deceased
Directed Donations Made in the Absence of a Preexisting
Relationship Would Not Fatally Conflict with State or Federal Law
Federal regulations and many state anatomical gift statutes ex-
pressly authorize directed organ donations from both living and de-
ceased donors. 159 For example, the UAGA states that an anatomical
gift may be made to "a designated individual for transplantation or
therapy needed by that individual.' 60 Nonetheless, there would be no
true conflict between these laws and an OPTN policy prohibiting
member transplant centers and OPOs from facilitating directed dona-
tions made in the absence of a preexisting relationship between the
deceased donor and the designated recipient.
Federal regulations and state anatomical gift statutes that permit
directed donation do not create any legal duty for transplant centers or
OPOs to agree to facilitate any particular directed donation.' 61 These
laws specify what entities a donor may name as the donee of an ana-
tomical gift but do grant either the donor or the designated recipient
the right to conscript transplant centers and OPOs into their services
to effectuate the gift. 162 A transplant center or OPO does not violate
laws or regulations permitting directed donations by refusing to facili-
tate any particular directed donation. Therefore, transplant centers and
OPOs should be able to comply with an OPTN policy limiting facili-
tation of directed deceased donation in the absence of a preexisting
relationship without violating federal or state laws that permit directed
donations generally.
Such an OPTN policy, would clearly limit the ability to direct a
donation. This limitation may be appropriate and consistent with the
legislative history of organ donation laws; permitting directed dona-
tions to strangers was not the intention behind the UAGA directed
159 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
160 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6(a)(3) (amended 1987) and §
1 l(a)(2)(amended 2006).
161 See discussion supra Part III.B. But if an OPO undertakes coordination of
a directed donation, the directed recipient may have an enforceable right to receive
such organ. See Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., 438 F.3d 214, 222-32
(2d Cir. 2006).
162 See Colavito, 438 F.3d at 222-32.
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donation provision. The drafters of the UAGA never contemplated
directed donations arranged through solicitations and made in the ab-
sence of any preexisting relationship. 163 An OPTN policy prohibiting
facilitation of deceased directed donation to strangers would only
limit the right to direct a deceased donation in a way that the more
general right was never intended to be exercised. Thus, it is unlikely
that a court would find that such a policy conflicts with the letter or
the purpose of federal regulations and state laws that permit directed
donation. 
64
E. Legislatively Restricting Directed Donations
A carefully drafted amendment to NOTA or to state anatomical
gift statutes could effectively prevent directed donations to deceased
directed donation solicitors and withstand a constitutional challenge.
Such a restriction could be written to limit directed donation to an
individual with whom the deceased donor (or donor family) had a
preexisting relationship before the recipient's need for a transplant
was first identified. This would prevent deceased directed donations to
individuals with whom the donor or donor family came into contact
solely for the purpose of facilitating a transplant without affecting
directed donation to family members or friends.' 65 Such a law might
be challenged on the grounds of infringement of free speech,
state/federal conflict of law principles, or substantive due process.
163 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
164 Nevertheless, even if there was a perceived conflict, such an OPTN policy
would likely be enforceable. Although federal regulations expressly permit directed
donation and require the Secretary of HHS to approve all OPTN policies, this HHS
final rule may be unconstitutional to the extent that it conflicts with OPTN allocation
policies because Congress granted the OPTN and not HHS the authority to set alloca-
tion policies. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 121.4, 121.8(h) (2000); Chen, supra note 105, at 280.
Also, given that such a policy would not conflict with the purpose of the regulation
permitting directed donation, there is little reason to think the Secretary would not
approve it. With regard to state law, if there was a conflict, the OPTN policy would
preempt the state law through either conflict or field preemption to the extent that
state laws permit directed donation in the absence of a preexisting relationship be-
cause Congress has authorized the OPTN to set national allocation policies under
NOTA. See supra note 136. NOTA was validly enacted under Congress's spending
power and its power to regulate interstate commerce. See supra notes 136-41 and
accompanying text. But see Chen, supra note 105, at 281-82 (arguing that courts are
reluctant to find that a private organization's policies preempt state law and reluctant
to find that a federal interest preempts an entire field of law).
165 It is possible to draft the law more broadly to prohibit all deceased directed
donations. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5242(a), (d) (2000) (allowing only living
donors to make a directed donation). However, such a law would prohibit even de-
ceased directed donations to family members and friends, which may be undesirable
as a policy matter.
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However, neither the free speech argument nor a conflict of laws chal-
lenge is likely to be successful, as discussed above. The substantive
due process challenge merits further consideration.
Generally, courts defer to legislatures and will only invalidate a
law on substantive due process grounds if the law infringes a funda-
mental right.166 If a right is not enumerated in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court often will only consider it fundamental if it "is deeply
rooted in [the] [n]ation's history and tradition., 167 An important factor
for determining whether a right is rooted in tradition is how broadly
the right can be defined.
The right to direct an organ donation is clearly not deeply rooted
in the history and tradition of the nation. Traditionally at common
law, courts have found that, at most, one has only a quasi-property
right in one's own tissues and only a limited right to direct burial and
disposition in the body of a deceased family member. 168 Also, most
courts have refused to apply the traditional legal frameworks of prop-
erty and contract law to organ transplantation cases when there is an
applicable statute that has balanced the moral and social issues.
169
Thus, the legal right to direct a donation as either a fundamental prop-
erty or contract right is not likely to be considered deeply founded in
our nation's history and tradition. It is statutory and was created by
state legislatures following the adoption of the UAGA in 1968.170
And, in fact, at least one state prohibits directed deceased donation
entirely. 171
It may be possible to characterize directed donation as a tradi-
tional right by more broadly defining it as the right to control the
disposition of one's body parts or remains. 172 In Brotherton v.
Cleveland,173  the Sixth Circuit and, in Newman v.
Sathyavaglswaran,174 the Ninth Circuit found a fundamental right to
control the final disposition of one's body that extended to property
interests of possession and transfer and that was protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 175 Defined this broadly,
166 U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
167 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977).
168 Perry v. St. Francis Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1563 (D. Kan. 1995). See
also Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, Inc., No. 09320, slip op. (N.Y. Dec. 14,
2006) (finding no common law property right to donated organs).
169 Wilson v. Adkins, 941 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997).170 UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFt ACT § 3 (amended 1987).
171 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5242(a), (d) (2000).
172 Venner v. State, 354 A.2d 483, 498-99 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976).
173 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991).
174 287 F.3d 786, 796-97 (9th Cir. 2002).
175 Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482; Newman, 287 F.3d at 796-97.
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such a constitutional right would seem to prevent legislatures from
limiting one's ability to transfer an anatomical gift to an individual of
one's choosing.
Nevertheless, both the Brotherton and Newman cases related to a
situation in which the state interfered with the rights of the next-of-kin
by statutorily authorizing coroners to remove a deceased's corneas
without consent or even providing the next-of-kin with notice.
176
Thus, the more narrow reading of these holdings is simply that the
state cannot violate the next-of-kin's property interest in a deceased's
body by taking a body part without obtaining consent. Framed this
way, the protected right seems to be a negative right to be free from
interference with possession of a body, not a positive right to demand
specific transfer of body parts.
Although the Second Circuit in Colavito v. New York Donor Net-
work177 raised the question of whether the designated recipient of a
directed donation has a property right in the directed organ, a subse-
quent opinion from the New York Court of Appeals in the case con-
cluded that there is no such common law right, and no court has found
a fundamental legal right to transfer a body part to a specific person of
one's choosing.' 78 Defining the right to control the disposition of the
body broadly enough to encompass such a right may have undesirable
consequences. For example, one would be able to argue that an organ
donor has a fundamental legal right to place categorical restrictions on
a donation so that only certain races or classes of people could be re-
cipients. State laws such as the Florida statute that prohibits donors
from placing discriminatory restrictions on potential recipients of an
anatomical gift on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national ori-
gin, age, physical handicap, health status, marital status, or economic
status might be invalid. 179 A right to place such discriminatory restric-
tions on an organ donation is not traditional and has never been rec-
ognized as such at common law or in statute. 180
Congress and the states adopted NOTA and the UAGA before pa-
tients were publicly soliciting directed donations, and legislators
176 Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482; Newman, 287 F.3d at 798.
177 438 F.3d 214, 222-32 (2d Cir. 2006); Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Net-
work, Inc., No. 09320, slip op. (N.Y. Dec. 14, 2006).
' Colavito, 438 F.3d at 222-32 (certifying questions back to the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York, including whether New York law vests directed
donation recipients with a property right in the directed organ); Colavito, No. 09320,
slip 179 FLA. STAT. § 765.513(4) (2005).
180 There has never been a right to direct a donation to a class of people be-
cause statutes define directed donation as donation to a "designated individual." UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 6(a)(3) (amended 1987).
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likely only contemplated deceased directed donations made to family
members, close friends, or others with whom the donor had emotional
ties.' 8' With this background, the existing legal precedent, and the
undesirable consequences of drawing the right more broadly, a court
is likely to find that if there is a traditional legal right at all, it is de-
fined only as the right to direct a donation to a family member or
friend. Even if the right to direct a deceased donation could be con-
strued as rooted in the nation's history and tradition and, therefore, be
considered fundamental, the right to direct a donation to a stranger
would likely fall outside of any such right. A federal or state law that
prohibits directed donation in the absence of a preexisting relationship
would, therefore, likely withstand a legal challenge.
CONCLUSION
Lawmakers and health care providers should continue to permit
and encourage solicitations of directed donations from living organ
donors because this practice will serve to increase total organ dona-
tions without depriving potential recipients of organs they otherwise
would have received or compromising the principles of an established
allocation system. In contrast, solicitations of directed donations from
deceased donors should be restricted because such donations unjusti-
fiably sacrifice medical utility and are inequitable in that they favor
patients with "attractiveness," wealth, and the ability to draw media
attention. Public solicitations for directed deceased donation threaten
to undermine the national system, which is carefully established to
equitably and efficiently allocate deceased organs.
An outright ban on deceased organ solicitations may not be desir-
able and is not likely to withstand a constitutional challenge because
charitable solicitations are protected under the First Amendment as
free speech. However, intrusive organ solicitations for a directed de-
ceased donation can and should be subject to reasonable regulations,
such as restrictions on the information contained in organ solicitations
and the time, place, and manner in which directed donation solicita-
tions are made. Additionally, transplant centers should carefully con-
sider whether they wish to adopt a policy restricting transplants on
recipients who solicit directed deceased organ donations. OPOs
should also carefully consider adoption of a policy limiting facilitation
of directed deceased organ donations in the absence of a preexisting
relationship. Importantly, the OPTN is in a position of authority to
efficiently achieve uniform policy on this issue by limiting member
181 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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OPOs and transplant centers from facilitating deceased directed dona-
tions made in the absence of a preexisting relationship between the
donor and the designated recipient. Congress and states also have the
power to enact a statutory ban on deceased directed donations made in
the absence of a preexisting relationship, although this would seem to
be a politically less expedient route. All of these options to limit de-
ceased directed organ donations to solicitors should be considered.
The integrity of the national organ allocation system as a mechanism
to maximize equity and utility of a scarce resource and the thousands
of people awaiting a fair chance at receiving life-saving transplants
are at stake.

